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ABSTRACT 
Hugo Chávez, who was elected to the presidency of Venezuela in 1999, has 
become exemplary of the wider phenomenon of post-Cold War populism (or neo-
populism) in Latin America. He has successfully mobilized the poor in Venezuela and 
beyond, tapping into the resentment felt by the marginalized throughout the region after 
almost three decades of neo-liberal economic reform. This thesis explores how well he 
has done in promoting his brand of post-Cold War populism regionally and 
internationally. There is an important connection between his populism and his foreign 
policy. The thesis argues that while Chávez has been successful at garnering the support 
of the poor, his ultimate goal has increasingly become a desire to consolidate his own 
power. In classic populist fashion, Chávez has drawn many Venezuelans into a 
hierarchical patronage machine, which is dependent on his continued occupation of the 
presidency and on the use of the country’s oil wealth in order to survive. Furthermore, 
Chávez has taken significant steps to ally Venezuela with various rivals of the United 
States. However, despite, his regionally- and internationally-oriented rhetoric about 
Bolivarian Socialism and 21st century socialism, his efforts at building alliances to 
counterbalance United States hegemony are best understood by adopting a realist 
conception of Venezuelan foreign policy. His foreign policy can be viewed as being 
driven less by ideology and more by a desire to strengthen Venezuela’s position in the 
regional and international arena. Also, this thesis evaluates the ways in which the United 
States has dealt with the Chávez challenge and the effectiveness of such an approach. 
Ultimately, this thesis approaches Chávez as a symptom rather than a cause of broader 
political and socio-economic forces at work. It takes the position that U.S. policymakers 
should be concerned about the Chávez challenge, but not alarmed. Although he may have 
initially been considered a serious threat to the U.S. position in the region and beyond, his 
inability to create a robust coalition of nation-states to counter U.S. hegemony is 
evidence that his influence even in his own country may have peaked. 
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I. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Hugo Chávez, who was elected to the presidency of Venezuela in 1999, has 
become exemplary of the wider phenomenon of post-Cold War populism (or neo-
populism) in Latin America. Since he stepped onto the political stage in Venezuela with 
his failed coup attempt in 1992, he has positioned himself as the champion of the poor 
and marginalized in his country. He has also astutely mobilized the resentment against 
social and economic inequality experienced by many Latin Americans across the region. 
When he first came to power, conditions were optimal for the rise of ‘leftist’ populist (or 
neo-populist) movements riding the wave of discontent that had grown in reaction to the 
turn towards neo-liberalism in the region in the 1980s. President Chávez has taken full 
advantage of this popular dissatisfaction and sense of marginalization within Venezuela 
and beyond. Some ten years after he first assumed the presidency it is more important 
than ever to ask how well he has done in promoting his brand of post-Cold War populism 
regionally and internationally?  
To this end, this thesis will look at the following questions and issues: What are 
Chávez’s objectives? In addition, more particularly what are they based on: power, 
ideology, or somewhere in between? It will be emphasized that his efforts at building 
various alliances to counterbalance United States hegemony, reflects a realist calculation 
at work in shaping Venezuelan foreign policy rather than deep-seated ideological forces. 
Despite his insistence that he is spearheading Bolivarian Socialism at home and abroad, 
Chávez’s foreign policy appears to be grounded in power politics. At the same time, 
although the notion of a Bolivarian Revolution and Bolivarian Socialism are vague, and 
his approach to foreign policy is ultimately quite conventional, we need to ask whether 
there is a consistent ideology, even if it is shallow, which underpins his overall political 
project? Also, how successful has Chávez been in using his version of Bolivarian 
ideology to garner allies in his attempt to challenge U.S. hegemony in the region? If he 
has been successful, under what conditions is Chávez able to get other countries to act 
counter to United States interests? As we will, see, he has used Venezuela’s oil wealth to 
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bolster his foreign policy, an approach to international relations which, in Venezuela’s 
case, is not altogether new. Finally, we need to ask whether, or to what degree, Chávez is 
a threat to the U.S. ’national interest’ in the region and beyond? This in turn leads to an 
examination of U.S. policy towards Chávez and to an evaluation of how effective U.S. 
policy has been and can be in dealing with the Chávez challenge?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
While most nations-states in Latin America pursue foreign policy agendas that 
avoid outright opposition to the United States, Venezuela under Chávez has adopted an 
anti-U.S. stance that is unprecedented in post-Cold War Latin America. As the United 
States continues to look for a new grand strategy to replace that of containment 
associated with the Cold War, U.S. policy makers must formulate an approach that will 
meet an array of new challenges, including that represented by Chávez. This means 
knowing what exactly Chávez’s project is about and what its goals are in the region and 
beyond. It also means U.S. policymakers must understand the grievances of a large 
number of Latin American citizens, and their root causes, given that Chávez has been 
successful in gaining support in the region from people who remain poor and 
marginalized after over two decades of neo-liberal economic reform.  
Chávez has taken significant steps to ally Venezuela with various adversaries and 
rivals of the United States. His attempts to court Russia by declaring that Venezuela is 
willing to host Russian armed forces may be reminiscent of an earlier era when Cuba’s 
Fidel Castro was an important regional ally of the Soviet Union. The similarities between 
Chávez and Castro are striking. However, there are a number of major differences 
between Cold War Cuba and contemporary Venezuela. One in particular can be 
summarized in one word: oil. Venezuela’s tremendous oil wealth gives Chávez a level of 
regional and global influence that Castro reached primarily through presiding over 
thoroughly revolutionary social, economic and political changes in Cuba, complemented 
by his personal charisma. In fact, during the Cold War, Cuba was dependent almost 
entirely on oil supplied by Moscow. Venezuela, by contrast, is a major provider of oil to 
its allies in the region. It has also used oil to gain leverage internationally.  
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Some critics of U.S. policy in Latin America argue that those who have 
influenced Washington’s policies for the region have not changed much since the end the 
Cold War. They point to the continued impact on U.S. foreign policy on the part of 
former staffers of Jesse Helms, (sponsor of legislation that allowed companies doing 
business with Cuba to be targeted in U.S. courts) the designers of Nicaragua’s contra war, 
and the anti-Castro lobby.1 Certainly, relying on Cold War-style policies would be 
insufficient in dealing with the asymmetrical challenge posed by Venezuela. However, 
with the exception of Cuba, U.S. policy toward Latin America has changed considerably 
since the Cold War passed into history. To begin with, the U.S. ended its Cold War-
driven fixation on Central America almost 20 years ago. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), launched in 1994, as well as a number of other bi-lateral FTAs, the 
increased emphasis on the war on drugs soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a 
greater focus on immigration is all examples of significant policy changes since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.  
In fact, the shift in policy goes deeper than these few examples. The end of the 
Cold War has reduced the ideological constraints that influenced U.S. policy in the 
region, giving policymakers greater flexibility.2 Several post-Cold War developments 
have profoundly influenced U.S. policy in Latin America. First, Latin American countries 
are more democratic than during the Cold War. In the late 1970s, there were only three 
democratic countries in Latin America, excluding the Caribbean. By 1994, all except 
Cuba were classified as democratic or at least becoming so.3 With the spread of 
democracy throughout the region, it was much more difficult to consider these countries 
“pawns” of the Cold War superpowers.4 Consequently, Latin American countries have 
greater flexibility, particularly in terms of with which states they align themselves. 
Simply put, they can choose to adopt Washington’s policies or embrace other global 
players, such as Europe or China. The U.S. no longer has the same leverage in the region 
                                                 
1 Sweig, “Washington’s Cold War Echoes,” 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11244/washingtons_cold_war_echoes.html. 
2 Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War, xi. 
3 Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul, 5. 
4 Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War, xiii. 
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that it did during the Cold War. There are now other options for capital investment and 
Washington must compete with global rivals.5 This leads to the second development 
influencing U.S. policy. Globalization has increased international pressure on the U.S. to 
modify its “big stick” approach in its dealings with Latin America. Finally, with 
communism long gone as a global threat to U.S. national security, Washington now must 
deal with a greater variety of conflicting domestic opinions with regard to priorities in 
Latin America. That is why it is critical the U.S. develop a grand strategy for Latin 
America and it must be shaped taking into account these developments.  
U.S. policymakers argue that Latin America has taken a turn toward leftist or 
progressive governments and that Chávez is a key figure in this shift. This thesis will 
examine this proposition. It asks whether Chávez has been successful at swaying 
elections beyond his own borders by playing to anti-U.S. sentiment. He has certainly 
managed to rally large groups of sympathetic supporters wherever he speaks in Latin 
America.6 Chávez has demonstrated a willingness to adjust the rules of the democratic 
political game through a new constitution, augmenting the Supreme Court with his 
loyalists, and a new legislative assembly stacked in his favor, among other things. 
Meanwhile, he has been elected and reelected with increasing margins.  
Also of concern to U.S. policymakers, just as Venezuela has tried to become 
independent of international oil companies and control the production and sale of its 
petroleum, it has also attempted to influence the market to secure prices favorable to 
Venezuela. Despite, this effort, Venezuela is still a major supplier of oil to the U.S. and 
depends on the U.S. for refining Venezuelan oil. This contradiction has not, however, 
prevented Chávez from seeking to establish an autonomous leadership role for Venezuela 
as part of his wider opposition to globalization and neoliberal economic policies.7 In 
particular, Chávez has used oil to find allies and build a union of Latin American states 
that might, in theory, constrain United States power in the region. He has made it clear 
                                                 
5 Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War, xiii. 
6 McDonnell and Chen, “U.S. a Target at Summit in Argentina; Thousands of Protesters Want Bush 
Expelled. Venezuelan Leader Hugo Chávez Leads the Charge against a U.S. Free-Trade Plan for the 
Americas,” A.1. 
7 Cardozo, Venezuela: Petroleum, Democratization and International Affairs, 150. 
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that he is interested in developing or strengthening ties with long time foes of the United 
States, such as Cuba, Russia, and Iran.8 Other leaders in Latin America, perhaps too 
shrewd to overlook the oil deals, have jumped on Chávez’s anti-American imperialism 
bandwagon. Some have even moved beyond embracing the Venezuelan leader’s rhetoric 
to the signing of agreements with Iran supporting nuclear development. 
This thesis approaches Chávez as a symptom rather than a cause. It takes the 
position that U.S. policymakers should be concerned with Chávez but not alarmed. He is 
not a fundamental threat to the U.S. At the same time, the grievances of Venezuelans, and 
many other Latin American citizens, are real. Chávez came to power because he 
understood those grievances and because he was able to mobilize the masses of poor and 
disenfranchised people of his country and beyond, even though he has consistently failed 
to adequately address those very grievances that first brought him to power a decade ago. 
This is particularly surprising, given the tremendous oil wealth of Venezuela and the 
spike in oil prices over the course of his presidency. Under these circumstances, it 
borders on the astonishing that he has not done a better job of addressing the problems 
that continue to afflict Venezuela’s poor. His failure to alleviate poverty and improve 
social conditions leads to the obvious question: why? The answer, as this thesis argues, is 
to be found in the fact that Chávez has been primarily concerned with consolidating his 
power and securing his rule of the country. He has been far more successful in mobilizing 
people around the problems of poverty and inequality than he has at actually alleviating 
poverty and reducing inequality.  
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been a tremendous amount of research done on Chávez over the last 10 
years. This section attempts to capture the literature that relates to Chávez’s ability to 
challenge U.S. interest and how the U.S. has responded, and will center on some key 
issues.  First, some scholars argue that the rise of Chávez is only an indication of deeper 
socio-economic conditions related in part to poor U.S. policy toward the region.  Second, 
such U.S. policy is a result of the changes that occurred due to the end of the Cold War.  
                                                 
8 Trinkunas, “What is Really New about Venezuela’s Bolivarian Foreign Policy,” 2. 
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Finally, some discussion of what scholars have written regarding populism, along with 
the socio-economic conditions and post-Cold War policy shift, helps to understand the 
Chávez challenge.   
Adopting a highly critical perspective of the Bush administration, William 
Leogrande argues that due to the distraction of the Global War on Terror, President Bush 
“failed to respond to Latin America’s growing demand for social justice.”9 President 
Clinton’s neoliberal economic policies were never fully realized and the “economic 
model of open markets and free trade disappointed Latin Americans by failing to ‘change 
the lives of real people for the better,’ as Clinton promised.”10 With a poor showing for 
neoliberal economic policies, “people across Latin America were voting for governments 
of the left—a ‘new left,’ part populist and part socialist.”11 These new leaders, mostly 
populists, promised to improved living standards for the poor majority and were willing 
to use state power to correct market failures. The author argues that this is where 
Washington failed: by not responding to the region’s demand for social and economic 
change, Bush failed to meet the challenge of defining a relationship with Latin America 
that went beyond free trade. The failure of United States policy in Latin America is 
precisely what Chávez is using to garner political support. As long as the United States 
and its policies are viewed as one-sided and imperialistic, Latin Americans will look to 
an alternative. Chávez is offering himself as that alternative. 
Chávez, as already suggested, and to a certain degree confirmed by Leogrande, is 
not the cause, but the symptom of Latin America’s current woes. Furthermore, although 
U.S. post-Cold War policy towards Latin America has not followed the path suggested by 
Leogrande, U.S. policymakers have adapted policy to the post-Cold War realities of Latin 
America. As Russell C. Crandall suggests, Post-Cold War developments have given the 
governments of Latin America greater freedom to choose their own policies. They were 
free to choose Washington endorsed economic liberalization policies, or reject them.12 
                                                 
9 Leogrande, “A Poverty of Imagination: George W. Bush's Policy in Latin America,” 385. 
10 Ibid., 356. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War, xiii. 
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Some would dispute the idea that Latin American leaders had much choice in relation to 
neoliberal policies. It may have been simply much easier to go with the regional and 
global trend toward these policies than buck Washington. Nonetheless, some leaders in 
the region embraced neoliberalism enthusiastically. While in many instances leaders in 
Latin America were embracing neo-liberalism, the debt crisis and the structural 
adjustments that went with it cannot be ignored, nor can the fact that a number of Latin 
American leaders were critical of neo-liberalism prior to election and then were found 
adopting such policies once elected. Regardless, the fact that Chávez is able to even 
implement ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Americas or Bolivarian Alternative 
for the People of Our America), and establish ties with U.S. adversaries is a sign that the 
U.S. has turned away from “Big Stick” tactics employed by the U.S. during the Cold 
War.  
Writing in 2001 from a clearly sympathetic point of view, the British journalist, 
Richard Gott sought to provide the historical background for understanding Chávez and 
the Bolivarian Revolution. Gott argues that Chávez is a unique late-twentieth and early 
twenty-first century political figure in Latin America. Significantly, Chávez’s early 
inspirations were not Castro or even Marx.13 As Gott emphasizes, the Latin American 
leaders that have influenced Chávez were Simón Bolívar, Simón Rodriguez, and General 
Ezequiel Zamora. Gott claims that Chávez knows “a revolution cannot succeed on 
borrowed money, and he knows that the armed forces cannot rule on their own. They 
need the support of the great mass of the people.”14 Chávez is uniquely gifted with the 
charisma needed to gain such mass support and the ideology he espouses suits him well 
in framing the issues in a way in which the people can identify. According to Gott, 
Chávez is “a serious revolutionary trying to carve out a new program for America.” He 
continues, “Chávez believes he can bring about a multi-polar world with a different 
economic consensus offered by Washington and which has had such a devastating impact 
on the poorest populations of the Third World.”15 Some of Gott’s analysis has proven to 
                                                 
13 Reid, Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul, 165. 
14 Gott, In the Shadow of the Liberator, 93. 
15 Ibid., 7. 
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be flawed with the passage of time. For example, he asserted that Chávez would continue 
capitalist policies and that the President would be unlikely to show hostility toward the 
U.S. In fact, he concluded his book by writing, “Free elections have sometimes turned up 
winners who are too far to the left to be easily countenanced by governments in 
Washington. Successive American governments have had innumerable arrows in their 
quiver for destroying regimes of which they disapprove.”16 Yet, Chávez’s has engaged in 
a continuous stream of anti-U.S. vitriol. The fact is Washington has had the opportunity 
to destroy the Chávez regime, and while there were obvious diplomatic blunders by the 
Bush administration, particularly by not immediately denouncing the 2002 coup, there is 
no evidence Washington initiated or supported the coup.17 In fact, we might be able to 
conclude that by and large Washington sees Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution as relatively 
unimportant compared to other foreign policy issues, even other issues in the region.  
Gott also states Chávez “is desperate for foreign investment” and would be 
cautious not to scare off investors.18 His record contradicts this. Chávez’s management of 
key sectors of Venezuela’s economy, and perhaps the economy as a whole, fits in with 
his overall populist ideology. Certainly, the public ownership and state control of the 
economy can be read as an ideological commitment to state-led national development 
with socially redistributive characteristics. However, his inability to bring about such 
redistribution, along with his unrestrained and reckless management of the economy, 
particularly the oil industry, signifies perhaps that he has been playing straightforward 
power politics from the outset. Chávez has seized the oil industry of Venezuela and 
cashed it in the short term as it were, to win votes and gain support for referendums that 
consolidate his power in the country. In the process, he has nationalized oil fields in 
Venezuela leaving foreign oil companies with a bitter taste.  
Chávez’s outspoken criticism of the U.S. is in part an effort to divert attention 
away from his poor management of the Venezuelan oil industry. Having established his 
willingness to challenge U.S. global interests, how does Chávez justify such anti-U.S. 
                                                 
16 Gott, In the Shadow of the Liberator, 228. 
17 Crandall, The United States and Latin America after the Cold War, xiii. 
18 Gott, In the Shadow of the Liberator, 173. 
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sentiment? Chávez hardly delivers a speech or even says a word in public without 
invoking the name of the almighty Libertador, Simón Bolívar. As Nikolas Kozloff puts 
it, “In seeking to compare himself with Bolívar, [President] Chávez seem[s] to be 
pitching himself to the Venezuelan people as a revolutionary fighting against an 
imperialist power, in this case the United States.”19  
Bolívar is revered through Latin America, but particularly in the Andean region. 
What Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln are to the United States, Bolívar is to these 
countries, all rolled in to one. Bolívar was influential in the liberation of six countries: 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, Perú, and Venezuela. Bolívar is an integral part of 
the heritage of these nation-states; the cornerstone of their national histories. Chávez’s 
use of Bolivar’s image is designed to garner domestic support for his anti-imperial stance 
and his South American unity efforts.20 There is a common perception in the Andean 
nations that Simón Bolívar was opposed to the United States because he viewed it as a 
threat.21 Bolívar was a complex man and his life was full of contradictions. He was “a 
liberator who scorned liberalism, a soldier who disparaged militarism, a republican who 
admired monarchy.”22 He developed an appreciation for liberal ideas early in his life as 
he toured Europe and could be considered to have been a radical. However, after the 
years of fighting for the liberation of the Americas from Spain and trying to assemble a 
state, he hardened and became quite conservative, even suggesting that there was a need 
for lifetime rulers.  
This has not prevented various political leaders over the years, and now Chávez, 
from comparing themselves to Bolívar in an attempt to tap into his legacy.23 For 
example, the urban guerrilla group M-19 (19th of April Movement) brandished Bolívar’s 
sword taken from a museum to inspire revolution.24 Bolivarianism, which emerged as a 
                                                 
19 Kozloff, Hugo Chávez: Oil, Politics, and the Challenge to the U.S., 3. 
20 “Time to Liberate the Liberator,” 41. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Lynch, Simón Bolívar: A Life, xi.  
23 Irwin, “The Literature behind Venezuelan Bolivarianism,” 1. 
24 Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America, 307. 
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concept based loosely on Bolívar’s ideas, was used by General López-Contreras, 
president of Venezuela in the late 1930s, to combat leftist ideology. He essentially 
tailored and transformed Bolívar’s ideals into an official doctrine.25 Retired Venezuelan 
Admiral Gruber-Odreman, in his book Soldado Alerta!, used Bolivarian principles to 
“justify a Creole/Latin America military aimed at fighting threats…from the United 
States, the World Bank, and the combination of globalization and neoliberalism.”26 The 
reality is that Bolívar wrote and said so much, and so much more has been said about him 
and his ideas by historians and commentators that it is easy to cherry-pick his writings 
and produce principles that can suit the purposes of either end of the ideological 
spectrum.  
The selective use of Bolívar’s legacy for framing his political project is an 
important element in Chávez’s brand of populism (or neo-populism). In fact, to 
understand Hugo Chávez’s success the concept of populism must be explored. Michael 
Conniff defines populism in terms related to elections and enfranchisement. Specifically, 
he describes populism as, “an expansive style of election campaigning by colorful and 
engaging politicians who could draw masses of new voters into their movements and 
hold their loyalty.”27 They do so with assurances that the interests of the common man 
and woman will be foremost on their mind when in power. There is more to it than 
charisma. Populists are not so much about a particular ideology, and in fact, they change 
their rhetoric to appeal to the most voters at any given moment.28 Therefore, populists 
rely on attracting those disillusioned or frustrated with traditional politicians and those 
opposed to the establishment.  
Thomas Skidmore and Peter Smith argue there were essentially two forms of 
populist polities, which first appeared in Latin America in the 1930s. The first operated as 
what Paul Cammack calls “partial democracies…in which industrialists and workers 
gained some limited access to power through relatively open electoral competition.” The 
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26 Ibid., 82. 
27 Conniff, Populism in Latin America, 4. 
28 Ibid., 5. 
 11
second were “‘populist regimes’… in which more authoritarian leaders put together 
multi-class alliances through corporatist organization and strictly controlled mobilization 
of political participation.”29 The Great Depression and the World War II brought about 
“redistribution of income through the incorporation of the popular masses-above all, the 
urban working classes-into the political system, a central role for the state in economic 
and social policy, and a constant evocation of the nation and its sovereignty.”30  
These populist regimes exhibited some common characteristics. First, they 
centered on a charismatic leader. Second, they were also developmentalist in nature. 
Third, none was particularly committed to the principles of liberal democracy. Finally, 
the opposition each faced was usually politically weak.31 Although populism in this era 
was a successful political strategy, “it had weaknesses which limited its ability to provide 
economic development and stable government over the long term.” Cammack continues, 
“Its proponents needed to maintain the confidence of business sectors (with many 
traditional elites alienated from the start) while preserving the loyalty of the working 
classes and keeping control of the political organizations (usually state-backed trade 
unions) created to mobilize them.” He adds, “these conflicting political demands 
continually threatened to become unmanageable, particularly when their economic 
strategy began to run into difficulties.”32  
The period between the 1930s to the 1950s can be characterized as the era of 
classic populism, with charismatic figures such as Argentina’s Peron or Mexico’s Lazaro 
Cardenas rising to prominence. Chávez’s style of populism, also known as neo-populism, 
differs somewhat from the classic form, with the main difference being the level of actual 
reform on the part of the neo-populist is much weaker than Peron or Cardenas, for 
example. Chávez has promised social and economic reforms that will benefit the masses 
of poor in Venezuela. Attempting to exhibit his compassion for the downtrodden, he 
stresses his own childhood experience with poverty to connect with followers. 
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32 Ibid., 165. 
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Nationalism is an integral part of his appeal. In his attempt to appeal to the common 
citizen, he poses as a defender of Venezuelan sovereignty against exploitation by the 
United States. Furthermore, he has tapped into anti-U.S. sentiment throughout Latin 
America, which in turn has provided some impetus for the election of leftist political 
leaders in the region that will side with him and not the United States. Considering these 
elements of Chavismo, Chávez clearly fits Conniff’s definition of a populist.  
Meanwhile, there is also considerable debate about how significant a threat 
Chávez is to the U.S. and its interests in Latin America. For example, Max Manwaring 
expounds on the implications of the rise of Chávez for the United States, arguing that 
Chávez is attempting to gain the asymmetric advantage over the United States by 
promoting Latin American integration under “a ‘Bolivarianismo’ security scheme, social 
programs, and communications efforts” in what he terms a “whole war” against the 
United States. He continues, “Chávez understands that asymmetric warfare is the 
methodology of the weak against the strong.”33 Through these instruments, Chávez 
“seeks to shift the playing field away from conventional military confrontations and turn 
to nontraditional forms of assault on [the United States government’s] stability and 
integrity.”34 Although Manwaring provides great insight into fourth generation warfare 
and the potential challenge it will have on the United States, he overstates his case with 
Chávez, giving him too much credit for the move towards the left and the rise of anti-
U.S. sentiment in the region and beyond. Manwaring’s alarming analysis of the threat 
Chávez poses was written when the latter’s star was in the ascendant.  
A more measured assessment of Chávez’s geopolitical significance is provided by 
Harold Trinkunas. He points out that Chávez’s Bolivarian foreign policy is less about 
strategic independence and maximizing oil revenue and more about finding allies willing 
to challenge U.S. power and influence in the region.35 And thus far, none of those allies  
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have been geopolitically significant. Trinkunas puts Venezuela and its Bolivarian foreign 
policy in perspective, not giving Chávez too much credit for the overall leftist trend in 
elections and politics in Latin America over the last decade. 
Most scholars, after a decade of observation, agree that Chávez poses no 
immediate threat to the U.S. However, U.S. policymakers must take into account the 
conditions that gave rise to the populist president and to other leaders like him. 
Washington must continue to signal its interest in improving social and economic 
conditions in the region while respecting democratic rule. If it fails to do so, it will 
continue to encounter similar challenges such as the one Chávez poses. In post-Cold War 
Latin America, the U.S. has the flexibility, but also the necessity, to articulate a grand 
strategy for the region that treats Chávez as a symptom of a wider trend that needs 
addressing.  
D.  ARGUMENT 
Taking a realist perspective, this thesis will argue that Chávez is an opportunistic 
populist riding the national and regional wave of hostility to the neo-liberal economic 
reforms of the past three decades. Despite the Bolivarian rhetoric emphasizing social 
programs for the poor and Latin American solidarity, he is engaged primarily in a quest 
for power. Even if he started with a serious commitment to social reform he now conjures 
with a shallow ideology of Bolivarian socialism that promises far more than it can ever 
deliver. Furthermore, his anti-U.S. stance is defensive. When considering the actual 
instruments of power (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) at his disposal it 
is difficult to view Chávez as a serious threat to the United States. Whatever diplomatic 
power he has, it peaked at some point before the King of Spain publicly told him to ‘shut 
up’ in November 2007. Furthermore, although he has spent large amounts of money on a 
military buildup, he has a very long way to go before he could pose a threat to the United 
States militarily.  
E. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II will look at the factors that gave rise to Chávez. More specifically, 
Chapter II will cover the economic and social conditions present that allowed for the 
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“populist challenge” to emerge in the post-Cold War era. It is aimed at establishing the 
wider socio-economic context, such as the debt crisis, state-centric economic policies, 
and economic liberalization. Its primary theme is that Chávez and other populist political 
figures have successfully tapped into the widespread public resentment at social and 
economic inequality in Latin America. Chapter III will evaluate the impact Chávez has 
had on democratic governance in Venezuela. It will then turn to studying the impact his 
foreign policy has had in Latin America. Six countries, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador, 
Argentina, Perú, and Brazil will be covered. Finally, Chapter IV will discuss current U.S. 
policy toward Venezuela and the implications of those policies. The restoration of 
democracy after Fujimori in Perú will be used to evaluate possible scenarios in a post-
Chávez Venezuela. The chapter will conclude with some recommendations for U.S. 
policymakers.  
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II.  THE RISE OF HUGO CHÁVEZ: POPULISM AND THE 
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL CONTEXT 
Since gaining the Venezuelan presidency in 1999, Hugo Chávez has consolidated 
a broad, but fragile position as the key figure in what is often referred to as a new 
“populist challenge” in the region.36 In an effort to gauge the significance of the “populist 
challenge” generally, this chapter looks at the rise of Hugo Chávez in some detail to 
clarify where Chávez came from and his role in the wider rise of neo-populism in the 
region. This chapter argues that Hugo Chávez has successfully tapped into public 
resentment of social and economic inequality throughout Latin America, and particularly 
in Venezuela. Through populist rhetoric and social spending he has generated public 
support primarily from the poor and disenfranchised. The frustration with inequality has 
bred an antiestablishment sentiment among this group and Chávez has skillfully 
addressed this demand for recognition and/or redistribution. The ruling elite who he 
points out have fleeced Venezuela of its oil wealth have been particularly damaged by 
Chávez’s attacks. Chávez also verbally attacks the United States on a regular basis in 
great part due to the link between the dominant/hegemonic U.S. position in the region 
and the spread of neoliberal economic policies that have been blamed for widening 
income gaps and holding back the poor people and countries of Latin America. Having 
successfully tapped into this antiestablishment attitude in his country, Chávez has been 
successful at consolidating power. Chávez has justified his efforts to concentrate power 
by claiming Venezuela was suffering from social and economic crises, although since 
taking power his progress on addressing them has been quite limited.37 He has used state 
resources to reward his supporters and withheld those resources to punish his 
opponents.38 Ultimately, through what some scholars call a “quasi-tyranny of the  
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majority,” Chávez “has emerged as an example of how leaders can exploit both state 
resources and the public’s widespread desire for change to crowd out the opposition, and, 
by extension, democracy.”39  
This chapter will examine the economic and social context from which to 
understand better the conditions that gave rise to Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. I will first 
look at the period between colonization through the debt crisis to analyze the conditions 
that contributed to the widespread frustration with social and economic inequality. I will 
then discuss the different ways in which states have responded to these economic 
problems. Those countries that chose the free market approach still experienced 
significant problems associated with distribution and inequality. This and the backlash 
against neoliberal economics will be covered next. I will conclude with an analysis of 
how Hugo Chávez used this public frustration to pursue his agenda of consolidating 
power.  As a realist, Chávez believes he can accumulate a majority by appealing to the 
masses of disenfranchised voters.  Using democratic means, he has used that majority to 
maintain political power. 
The lessons that can be learned from the “populist challenge”, of which Chávez is 
a key figure, are important for United States policymakers. This is not necessarily 
because Chávez poses a significant threat to the United States or its interests in the 
region. To the contrary, many scholars and policymakers consider the threat from 
Chávez’s effort to counter United States interests to be on the decline. Although Chávez 
has shown he is willing “to project power or intimidate”40 well beyond Venezuela’s 
borders and he has increased military spending, the purchase of nearly obsolete weapons 
without the technical support to maintain them hardly presents a military threat to the 
United States. Of somewhat more concern than his diplomatic and military power is his 
use of economic instruments in the regional and international arena. This chapter also 
focuses on this potential concern.  
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A.  REGIONAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
1.  From Colonial Rule to the Debt Crisis 
To evaluate the socio-economic conditions that gave rise to Hugo Chávez and 
other populists in Latin America, the historical legacies of the region must be understood. 
Considering the vast area and diverse histories of Latin America, only a general sketch 
can be offered in such limited space. Nonetheless, there are some common themes in the 
economic history of the region. Some argue that the control of capital and political power 
by a small-landed elite dating back to the Spanish and Portuguese conquest and 
colonization of the Americas has resulted in weak internal market and severe income 
inequality. The concentration of land ownership by elites did lead to a boom in 
agricultural exportation during the latter part of the 19th century and the early 20th 
century. Development policy was “driven by the export sector, ignoring domestic 
production” while export demand “was determined abroad.”41 This posed significant 
problems in sustaining development since many Latin American countries relied on a few 
or a single export. Latin America’s landed elites failed to reinvest profits from exports 
which were critical to the development in other sectors of the economy.42  
Dependency theorist argued that rather than looking at any particular country’s 
resources, “progress could be attributed to the power [the country] had to set the rules of 
the international economic game.”43 Peripheral countries, which included much of Latin 
America, were at the mercy of industrialized countries of the world. Proponents of this 
theory contended that industrialized countries through the process of expansion were to 
blame for the underdevelopment of other countries.44 During the “march of capitalism,” 
industrialized countries exploited the weak countries for their cheap labor and abundant 
natural resources. Elites within these peripheral countries were part of the equation in that 
they made the deals with the international capitalists, profiting from their country’s 
resources with little or no thought of promoting domestic development. Eduardo 
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Galleano popularized this theory when he wrote Open Veins of Latin America, which was 
read widely in Spanish across Latin America when it was published in 1971. Whether 
there is merit to dependency theory or not is largely irrelevant for the purposes of this 
thesis. Mention of it here is important for understanding how this theory pits not only the 
developing against industrialized countries, but it also succinctly describes a traditional 
anti-elitist sentiment common throughout Latin America: one of the conditions that 
facilitated the rise of the populists generally, and Hugo Chávez, more specifically.  
During the 1930s and between the 1960s and 1980s, due to the international drop 
in demand for primary products other than oil, developing countries began to focus on 
adding value to products. It was thought that technology would do this and thus increase 
prices beyond that which could be earned for mere raw materials. Furthermore, 
structuralists maintained that the economy must be controlled by oligopolies who should 
determined prices and consumption patterns.45 In the case of Venezuela, Chávez and 
many others in the country saw the nation’s oil wealth being used to enrich the few 
controlling the oil industry. Also, a source of resentment highlighted by Chávez and his 
supporters was perception that elected officials were facilitating such exploitation.  
Recognizing the destabilizing affect of the international economy, Latin American 
policymakers walled their economies in with extremely protectionist policies in an effort 
to develop their industries. It was believed that state-driven economics could overcome 
market failures. This effort to break from dependency on the global economy by focusing 
on domestic production (starting in the 1930s) is commonly referred to as import 
substitution industrialization, or ISI. While there was some growth of domestic industry 
initially, there were significant problems resulting from ISI. By turning away from 
agriculture, many of Latin America’s poorest lost their primary source of income at the 
same time inflation increased dramatically. ISI also served to worsen inequality by 
empowering the elite class. It should be noted, ISI did not always help the landed elite. It 
did, however, strengthen or even create an elite group who operated industries behind 
tariff barriers. Furthermore, there are many examples of Latin American elites, especially 
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in some of the larger polities who began as landowners but took advantage of the 
protectionist environment and diversified into industry. An anti-elitist, or more generally, 
an antiestablishment sentiment grew out of this condition.  
The ISI model depended on a constant infusion of capital to fund long-term 
projects. The flow of capital was cut off when interest rates increased and the market for 
Latin American exports fell. Consequently, the economies of Latin America collapsed 
under the weight of overwhelming loans that could not be paid. By the 1980s, also known 
as the ‘lost decade,’ Latin America was in a debt crisis. Due to the inability to repay, 
most foreign banks stopped lending to Latin America. Giving up on ISI, most Latin 
American countries realized economic policy again had to transform and the IMF stepped 
in. In an effort to reduce absorption, the IMF prescribed austerity measures.46  
IMF plans drew criticism for prematurely contracting the economy without 
sufficiently addressing structural issues.47 Eventually, foreign capital returned to Latin 
America as trust increased. However, the resentment toward the international 
organizations that was seen as causing and later inadequately resolving the crisis lingers. 
Furthermore, the movement to the left in Venezuela in the 1990s came from the inability 
of several administrations to adapt to the debt crisis.48 With this came the breakdown of 
Venezuela’s traditional parties and thus leaving a political void to be filled by populists 
supported by popular movements disillusioned with the political establishment.49  
As a political outsider, Chávez promised to crack down on both public officials 
and private business actors that exploited the nation’s oil wealth. Many Venezuelans 
welcomed such antiestablishment fervor and believed the former coup leader was both 
serious and capable. It is a common misconception in among Venezuela’s lower class 
that if the nation’s natural resource wealth is not reaching them, then it is because 
someone is stealing it. Chávez was seen at the leader who could sweep out the crooks and 
redistribute the wealth. From the onset of his presidency, Chávez has sought to 
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nationalize oil production, and he eventually extended nationalization to other industries.  
Although he demanded greater government control over such industries, his seemingly ad 
hoc model differs from full-blown ISI in that rather than attempt to industrialize, he has 
sought to implement social programs.  
2.  The Role of the State (State-centric or Free Market Economics) 
Starting in the 1970s and through the 1980s, the emphasis after the debt crisis was 
on determining exactly to what extent the state should manage the economy. Determining 
the function of the government has “included elements of fiscal austerity, tax reform, and 
privatization to reduce the drag of deficits and the restructuring of the ownership role of 
the state.”50 Economists began to think a minimal role for the state was most efficient and 
would reduce deficits and relieve the state from determining production.51  
Neoliberals maintain that it was the downsizing of the state and liberalizing the 
economy that led to economic growth in the region. Indeed, the economic liberalization 
model has driven reform in Latin America. The Latin American debt crisis spurred 
economists to look to global markets to bring growth. With a newly defined role for the 
state that reduces its management of the economy international trade has been able to 
stimulate growth. However, the concern that the industrialized nations would out-
compete the developing countries was still a major concern. This has motivated the less 
industrialized nations to look toward regional integration to overcome their 
vulnerabilities and take advantage of opportunities, such as economies of scale. Still, 
from a dependency theory standpoint, critics such as Chávez, argue that free trade offers 
few gains for developing countries. While reduced tariffs increase the flow of trade, 
primary products still make up most of the export sector.52  
Chávez’s predecessor, President Rafael Caldera, was elected in 1994 to a second 
term in office on a platform of anti-neoliberalism, and in fact, was one of the first to show 
opposition to the IMF with regard to the Washington Consensus. However, just two years 
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later Caldera instituted an economic austerity package that signaled his conversion to 
neo-liberalism. The package initially included measures such as removing price 
restrictions (particularly on gasoline), removing controls on interest and exchanges rates, 
and even proposed an increase in luxury taxes. At the same time, Caldera pushed through 
social programs, such as giving a “family bonus” to Venezuela’s poorest families and 
fuel subsidies for public transit (to perhaps avoid riots that had occurred after previous 
increases in public transportation). Neo-liberals of the day contended that the austerity 
package was still insufficient since the state still owned most industries.53 Yet, Venezuela 
still had a large marginalized constituency that did not see the need for such austerity 
policies. Dissatisfaction with the lack of progress for the country’s poorest segments 
made an easily adopted platform for populists.  
The market reforms of the 1990s “have not met the high expectation of social 
progress hoped for.”54 Although there was some decline in poverty in many countries, it 
is reported that about one third of the population still lives in poverty and almost half of 
those in extreme poverty. Furthermore, due to domestic economic policies that favor the 
wealthy with little concern for improving education and other social service, Latin 
America suffers from dramatically unequal income distribution.55 Even though there 
have been high rates of growth since the early 2000s, “persistent inequality… appears to 
have deepened frustrations.”56 Interestingly, Caldera’s insufficient neo-liberal reform 
measures, combined with his role in breaking the Punto Fijo pact when he ran for 
election on the National Convergence ticket, created an environment ripe for the growth 
of populist politics. Granting amnesty to the 1992 coup participants certainly can be 
considered a necessary event in the rise of Chávez as well.  
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3.  The Challenge to Neoliberalism and Its Results 
The broad effects of the debt crisis were met with attempts by mainly the IMF and 
World Bank to implement free market reforms. Known as the Washington Consensus, or 
neoliberalism, many countries in the region applied a set of specific policies aimed at 
liberalizing their economies and opening trade. However, the poorest segments of the 
population were looking for quick fixes to their social plight and without immediate 
results, many became discouraged. Even though inflation was brought under control and 
growth occurred initially, several countries effectively saw their economies slide 
backwards.  
The lack of significant development in human capital, along with serious 
healthcare deficits in Latin America, has continued even after the implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies. This has caused serious doubt on the viability of such 
policies. As Reid states, “the disappointing record meant that the free-market reforms fell 
into widespread, albeit often unjust, disrepute.”57 It is not clear whether frustrations “over 
inequality [carried] over into wholesale backlash against market reforms.”58 Nonetheless, 
Chávez rose to power by doing exactly that; protesting over the real and imagined 
failures of neoliberalism. He offered better education and access to health services to 
Venezuela’s poor. He is also quick to blame the United States for advocating such 
policies.  
Some critics of United States economic policies in the region (as discussed 
earlier) argue that due to the distraction of the Global War on Terror, the United States 
“failed to respond to Latin America’s growing demand for social justice.”59 President 
Clinton’s neoliberal economic policies were never realized and the “economic model of 
open markets and free trade disappointed Latin Americans by failing to ‘change the lives 
of real people for the better,’ as Clinton promised.”60 Purportedly, failed neoliberal 
economics polices have led “people across Latin America…[to vote] for governments of 
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the left—a ‘new left,’ part populist and part socialist.”61 These new leaders promised 
improved living standards for the poor majority and were willing to use state power to 
correct market failures. Washington is faulted by the left in Latin American, particularly 
Chávez, among a few others, for not responding to the region’s demand for social and 
economic change. Especially venomous in his attacks on President Bush, he contends 
Washington failed to meet the challenge of defining a relationship with Latin America 
that went beyond free trade.  
With a more concrete post-Cold War policy that goes beyond the traditional 
levers of influence,62 Washington may have been able to respond to the concerns of many 
Latin Americas. Speaking specifically of economic levels, William Leogrande argues that 
polices such as tightening the embargo on Cuba, discontinuing remittances to El Salvador 
and Nicaragua, and reduced aid to Nicaragua and Bolivia, are insufficient in dealing with 
the challenges of Latin America. He continues by dismissing the notion that political 
levers are used primarily for the promotion of democracy. Furthermore, he indicates the 
resistance to United States policy in Latin America is founded on resentment over the 
reduction in U.S. aid. In essence, he argues that Washington’s reputation and relations in 
Latin America have deteriorated because it has failed to keep aid on track with inflation 
and ensure that aid improved the social conditions of the poor and that Chávez is at “the 
lead edge of a new political wave of leftist politics in Latin America” that represents “the 
symptom of deep-seated problems in the region, not the cause.”63  
Leogrande’s argument is flawed in that it begins with the premise that Latin 
America is entitled to economic aid from the United States. The economic policies 
pushed by Washington to encourage liberalization and free trade are in part intended to 
spur economic growth. It is aid by itself that perpetuates economic problems in Latin 
America by treating the symptoms rather than the causes of poverty and inequality. 
Regardless, Chávez could be considered the forerunner for the move toward the left.  
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Neoliberal economic reforms were linked to the onset of globalization. The 
sudden implementation of these reforms, particularly the lifting of restrictions on the 
movement of capital and a lack of supervision over the banking industry, reduced the 
likelihood of their success. Often these policies were incomplete or abandoned 
prematurely. However, the social and economic problems that were present before these 
reforms were attempted were now widely blamed on the Washington Consensus. As 
Moises Naím, former trade minister in Venezuela, commented, the Washington 
Consensus was a ‘damaged brand.’ Even though the term ‘neoliberalism’ is used 
disparagingly, its tenets (open market economics and stability) have continued to gain 
traction in much of Latin America.64  
4.  Chávez: Revolutionary or Authoritarian? 
Chávez is credited with breaking the two-party system in Venezuela when he was 
elected president in 1999 (although Caldera played a role in the demise of Punto Fijo as 
mentioned earlier). Chávez created the MBR-200 (Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario 200 or Bolivarian Revolution Movement) party in 1982 by pulling 
together military officers dissatisfied with political corruption in Venezuela. The party 
became emboldened following the 1989 riots known as Caracazo when hundreds of 
protestors were killed in Caracas. Following the 1992 coup attempt and subsequent 
pardoning by Caldera, Chávez changed the name of the party to MVR (Movimiento V 
[Quinta] República or Fifth Republic Movement), although there appeared to be little 
ideological evolution. In fact, there was a lack of any clear ideology of MVR and the 
party was built around Chávez. As one analyst describes, “it was to be a populist party 
with socialist, humanist and nationalist roots, and a sprinkling of the ideals that Simón 
Bolívar had formulated during the wars of independence.”65 The party essentially was his 
vehicle for pursuing power through popular political participation. His base was the 
country’s poor.66  
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Chávez’s opposition made a tremendous mistake by boycotting the elections in 
2005, which allowed MVR to sweep almost all the municipal and provincial elections. In 
December of 2006 the MVR was replaced by the PSUV (Partido Socialista Unido de 
Venezuela or United Socialist Party of Venezuela), a single Bolivarian party. With such a 
weak opposition to the PSUV, it has become a party in which those that are loyal to 
Chávez can receive special remuneration. It has also become an ad hoc union of small 
parties with varying ideologies.67  
Since 1998, “voters have elected Hugo Chávez to the Venezuelan presidency 
three times with increasing margins each time.”68 This certainly demonstrates the poor 
believe he is acting in their interests. Some argue that the Chávez supporters are “mis-
characterized by the media, the opposition, and some academic analysts as the poor and 
popular masses” and that “they are a mostly peaceful and autonomous counter-
hegemonic social movement that is allied with the state.”69 Therefore, to avoid 
trivializing the real problem of poverty and inequality throughout Latin America, it is 
important to recognize that Chávez supporters “are not solely dedicated to ensuring that 
Chávez remains in office but also carry out important social work.”70 They are politically 
sophisticated and have goals “that go beyond protecting the Chávez presidency.”71  
Fernando Coronil attempts to captures this when he discusses the cultural and 
political effects of Venezuela’s oil wealth. He asserts Venezuela is one of many countries 
that has been essential to the development of the modern world but has been marginalized 
in the process. Venezuela is “endowed with the power to replace reality with fabulous 
fictions propped up by oil wealth.”72 Dictatorial President Pérez Jiménez and democratic 
President Carlos Andrés Pérez both promoted the myth of progress during periods of 
extraordinary oil wealth and political stability. The Venezuelan state holds a monopoly 
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on the nation’s natural wealth and “by manufacturing dazzling development projects that 
engender collective fantasies of progress, it casts its spell over audience and performers 
alike.”73 To exacerbate the problem, the paradox of plenty, or the commodity boom that 
led to massive overspending, resulted in state fiscal crisis, political instability, and 
created a false image of development. Not only have oil-rich countries tended to suffer 
from oil booms, but they have failed to make petroleum the platform for sustained 
economic development.74 There is a strong strand in Venezuelan nationalism, which 
insists the nation’s oil wealth is the birthright of all Venezuelans. The state, or “magical 
state” as Coronil calls it, will deliver it to the people.75  
Hugo Chávez was elected and reelected to the presidency based on promises of 
social programs aimed primarily at improving life for the country’s poor funded by oil 
revenues. He operates under the premise that oil prices will continue at current prices or 
increase and with the windfall he can continue to fabricate the appearance of 
development in a way that benefits the nation’s poor. It is conceivable that Venezuela 
could have made a break from the ‘paradox of plenty’ pattern described by Karl and 
created a diversified economy. Unfortunately, he has failed to use oil revenue to spawn a 
non-oil economy. Chávez’s social programs, or missions, aimed at education, healthcare, 
environmental protection, and indigenous rights, are being financed by oil revenues. 
Furthermore, he is bartering oil off with other Latin American countries to boost his 
regional clout.76 
Meanwhile, he fails to reinvest oil profits into further production. To magnify the 
problem, Chávez fired approximately half of the oil company’s technical workers. If oil 
prices decline, Chávez will not be able to sustain his social programs. Since he has 
robbed the nationalized oil firm of the money needed to reinvest, the company will not be 
able to increase production to account for the lower prices.77 This road will result in 
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complete collapse of the Venezuelan economy, leaving Chávez sitting as a dictator since 
he has manipulated the political system to leave him nearly in complete control.  
Venezuela is the fourth largest supplier of oil to the United States, a fact that has 
allowed Chávez to use oil as a geopolitical weapon “through bargaining and maneuvering 
[and] has worked to achieve a higher price for oil through [OPEC].”78 He has exerted 
great control over petroleum resources in Venezuela. Chávez considers earlier 
Venezuelan regimes that were friendly with the U.S. as “unpatriotic and unduly 
subservient to United States interests, and failed to secure oil wealth for the good of 
Venezuelan society.”79 In Venezuela, “oil [is] seen as a symbol of national independence 
and sovereignty.”80 It has also arguably been part of creating an entitlement mentality 
among Venezuelans. This idea is that the Venezuelan people should not have to endure 
economic austerity measures because their oil-rich county is not like others in Latin 
America. It is all a matter of ridding the country of those that would steal the oil profits, 
such as the governments preceding Chávez or foreign oil companies.  
Chávez came to power at a time when government oil revenues from oil were 
falling dramatically, from 66 cents to 33 cents per dollar.81 Although previous oil booms 
earned Venezuela record profits, more than a third of the population made less than 
minimum wage.82 Chávez, whose family suffered from the unequal income distribution, 
has sought from the beginning of his presidency to bring oil companies under state 
control and promote economic prosperity for Venezuelans who had not benefited from 
the oil boon.83 Narrowly escaping the April 2002 coup and assassination, Chávez became 
even more determined to strengthen his control over oil policy.84 
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The Venezuelan government had the potential to benefit from the rise in world oil 
prices, which has sparked an economic boom. However, the spending on social programs 
has served Chávez and his populist agenda more than the poor. Since he was reelected, 
Chávez has announced new measures to move the country toward socialism and the 
current commodity boom has certainly buoyed Chávez, but his economic plan is 
unsustainable.85 Venezuela has experienced massive political and economic changes 
since Hugo Chávez first appeared on the scene. With a new constitution and unicameral 
legislature, many international observers have rightfully faulted Chávez for the rapid 
deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela.  
B.  THE POPULIST CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 
What impact has the populist challenge had on democracy in Venezuela as 
Chávez uses his charisma to employ mostly democratic means to consolidate power in 
the executive? As already discussed, populism and inequality pose the greatest threat to 
democratic stability. Inequality weakens the people’s commitment to democracy and 
populism allows power hungry actors to move government toward authoritarianism 
through the power of their personality once commitment toward democracy has been 
weakened.  
Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl provide an excellent discussion of 
democracy in What Democracy is…and is Not. They write, “…political democracy is a 
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable…by citizens, acting indirectly 
through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.”86 The pattern 
by which actors find access to public offices and the rules that these actors subsequently 
follow to make “publicly binding decisions” must be clearly institutionalized.87 
According to the authors, the method of institutionalizing is generally best if it is a 
“written body of laws undergirded by a written constitution.”88  
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Other characteristics of a modern democracy include competition and majority 
rule, both of which will be discussed in further detail when comparing democracy in 
Venezuela and Perú. The procedures that make democracy possible include, among 
others: the government is elected in frequent and fair elections without coercion, civil 
liberties are protected, the electorate includes most of the adult population, most adults 
have the right to run for public office, and citizens are free to express themselves and 
form associations (including, of course, political parties). In addition, one of the other 
characteristic offered by Schmitter and Karl include a popularly elected government that 
acts independently without the military or other non-elected officials encroaching on the 
domain of the elected leaders.89 This definition of democracy and list of procedures are 
helpful in evaluating the completeness of democracies anywhere in Latin America, but 
especially Venezuela and Perú.  
Chávez fits what Kenneth Roberts, in Latin America’s Populist Revival, describes 
as a populist: “[He is] virtually synonymous with populism, endowing the concept with 
vivid images of charismatic rulers who energize the masses, challenge traditional elites, 
and assert national autonomy in the international arena.”90 His rise appears to be “rooted 
in the limitations of the ‘dual transitions’ toward political and economic liberalism—or 
democracy and free market.”91 As Matthew Cleary states, “Chávez is the only sitting 
president who is unambiguously ‘populist,’ in the sense that he actively undermines 
independent sources of institutional authority and draws his political power primarily 
from a charismatic and paternalistic connection with the masses.”92  
The conditions most conducive to the rise of Chávez include political exclusion. 
In Venezuela, as in the rest of Latin America, elites counted on a “responsive labor force 
without an effective threat of political participation by the working class.”93 By  
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successfully mobilizing the large working and poor class Chávez has used their political 
participation in mass to push out of power the elite class and ultimately putting himself in 
their place. 
However, the case of Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela 
counters the notion that the people play a role in transitioning toward democracy when 
they mobilize. John Peeler, in Building Democracy in Latin America, writes, “Social 
movements are collective action of people beyond the level of family but not part of any 
existing party or other political institution…”94 In the example of Venezuela, the 
mobilization of mass constituencies has been from the top-down. While Hugo Chávez 
originally presented himself as a common citizen from a humble background who was 
frustrated with the social, economic, and political conditions in the country, he later used 
his executive position to exploit the masses for his purposes, mainly the consolidation of 
power.95 Although the management and expansion of popular participation was key in 
the transition toward democracy in the earliest wave of democracy,96 popular 
mobilization in Venezuela has helped Chávez move toward authoritarian rule.  
Schmitter and Karl’s definition of democracy includes competition. Javier 
Corrales and Michael Penfold, in Venezuela: Crowding out the Opposition, provide an 
insightful analysis of Chávez’s domestic political competition. Through a “quasi-tyranny 
of the majority,” Chávez has “emerged as an example of how leaders can exploit both 
state resources and the public’s widespread desire for change to crowd out the opposition, 
and, by extension, democracy.”97 Chávez has engaged in a “heavy barrage of state 
spending aimed at rewarding loyalists and punishing dissidents.”98 He quickly rewrote 
the “rules of governing relations among the branches of government in order to make the  
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presidency stronger.”99 He astutely appealed to his constituents’ antiparty frustration and 
convened a National Constituent Assembly for the purpose of shifting the balance of 
power in favor of the executive branch.100  
There is a serious threat to democracy with such intense concentration of power in 
the executive branch. John Carey, in his analysis of “presidentialism” and representative 
institutions in Latin America, points out that the executive branch is potentially more 
dangerous than the legislative.101 The executive, he argues convincingly, is prone to 
“capricious action or…abrupt policy reversals.”102 Furthermore, he submits the executive 
branch tends to be less inclusive or subject to negotiation and compromise, and less 
transparent than the legislature.103  
One of the major changes to the electoral institution in Venezuela in the 1990s 
was the turnaround of the practice of prohibit immediate reelection.104 While Carey 
identifies ways in which this generally strengthens democracy, it has not fared well for 
Venezuela. Reelection perhaps increase democratic responsiveness by encouraging first-
term presidents to be more accountable to citizens’ concerns, however, there is also the 
all too common problem of abuse of power by presidents determined to guarantee their 
reelection.105 This allowed Chávez to overcome limitations that come from lame-duck 
status. It gave him significantly greater “authority…over other public officials by 
extending [his] prospective control [as] incumbents over patronage and prospects for 
advancement farther down the political career ladder.”106  
Also related to the strengthening of the executive branch in Venezuela is the 
change to the procedures for a presidential recall. The 1999 Venezuelan constitution 
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created a provision making the “threshold for removal [of a president] the number of 
votes cast… in the original popular vote.”107 This makes the recall of Chávez highly 
unlikely since he secured nearly 60 percent of the vote during a high-voter turnout 
election in 2000. Considering the high voter abstention rates in later elections, Chávez 
has reason to feel safe against a recall.  
His popularity among the voters has been linked to social spending. Corrales and 
Penfold point out, “The deluge of money that [Chávez] poured out in 2004 (close to 4 
percent GDP) enabled him to turn his low 2003 approval ratings of around 45 percent 
into a 59 percent victory in the August 2004 recall referendum.”108 However, Chávez 
appears as if he is becoming a slave to the masses he once used to rise to power. His 
December 2007 referendum for constitutional reforms was defeated and has been his 
worst setback since becoming president in 1998.109 Although concerns of continued 
concentration of the executive branch are partly to blame, abstention of three million 
Venezuelan voters can be argued to be a consequence of Chávez inattention to the social 
and economic problems he was once so concerned with in his country. The Venezuelan 
population has been known to have a high sense of entitlement due to its vast oil wealth 
and Chávez has suffered at the polls due to his inability or unwillingness to funnel the 
revenue to social spending which the public has increasingly grown to expect from him.  
Given the populist aversion to coordinated party opposition, a move toward 
greater democracy in Venezuela is unlikely in the near future.110 Unfortunately, Chávez 
has created profound polarization and long-term political cleavages.111 Not only has 
Chávez’s efforts to marginalize his domestic political competition made stable 
democracy difficult to maintain in the country, Venezuela is headed toward authoritarian  
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rule with startling speed. According to Robert Kaufman, “the long-term prospects for 
Venezuela would be [a] mutually destructive confrontation between Chavistas and anti-
Chavistas.”112 
Democracies are susceptible to populist actors that seek power. The very 
institution that allows them to come to power also enables them to consolidate power and 
move toward authoritarianism. It can be argued that social and economic inequality and 
the distribution of wealth are significant obstacles to democracy. Policies that improve 
access to education and other social services for the poor are essential to reducing 
inequality, however, “such policies may first require political reforms so that the voice of 
the poor carries equal weight to that of the rich.”113 Inequality breeds divisiveness and 
cleavages that undermine democratic stability. In countries where approximately half of 
the population lives in poverty, one would expect voters to favor candidates that promise 
redistribution. When the wealth and political power are concentrated, the elite class is 
likely to use authoritarian means to maintain a hold on both. Although Kaufman refutes 
this notion, he does, however, concede that there are negative effects on democratic 
stability. For example, in Venezuela, “the divisive policies of the Chávez government are 
likely to have effects on class conflict that endure far beyond the tenure of his 
government itself.”114 These conflicts are what potentially lead to a challenge to 
democratic rule as groups use extralegal means to maintain power if they have it, or 
violence if they do not. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
In Latin America, the history of the exploitation of natural resources and of labor 
has had a lasting effect, particularly with regard to the distribution of wealth. In an 
attempt to develop, many Latin America countries looked inward to pursue 
industrialization. The consequence was a debt crisis that left states far short of their  
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economic goal. States that deregulated their economic systems experienced growth, but 
the gains were not as far reaching as touted and many of Latin America’s poor were 
disillusioned.  
Chávez has astutely mobilized the resentment of social and economic inequality 
experienced by many Latin Americans across the region. When he first came to power, 
conditions were optimal for the rise of ‘leftist’ populist movements and Chávez took 
advantage of it with some success within Venezuela and beyond. This chapter has 
explored the socio-economic context in Venezuela that led to the rise of Hugo Chávez. 
With Chávez firmly in power, he has looked to influence inter-American relations. 
Chávez’s anti-U.S. campaign highlights weaknesses in United States foreign policy and 
the need to develop a new grand strategy for the region. Understanding the grievances 
that flow from the promotion of neoliberal policies and free trade, and the frustration due 
to social and economic inequality, the United States can better develop policies that 
address the primary concerns of the Latin Americans. 
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III.  EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF CHÁVEZ IN THE REGION 
This thesis argues that Chávez’s political strategies are essentially opportunistic. 
Since his first appearance in Venezuela he has capitalized on the pervasive resentment of 
the poor and marginalized population, although he has made only limited progress 
towards addressing the root causes of this resentment. His influence has not been 
restricted to his own people. He has tapped into the resentment many Latin Americans 
feel regarding the economic conditions. When it comes to using that resentment for his 
political purposes, how has he fared internationally?  
In late 2005, the world began taking notice of what appeared to be a move to the 
left as countries throughout Latin America were electing leftist governments. Some 
believed Chávez was at the heart of this shift as he sought to sway elections in the region. 
Was he another Castro, looking to export his revolution? Concerns heightened as socialist 
Evo Morales, of indigenous descent and former leader of the coca growers union, was 
elected as president in Bolivia in 2005. Socialist Michelle Bachelet won the presidency in 
Chile in 2006, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, former trade union boss, won reelection as 
president of Brazil in 2006. Ecuador elected Rafael Correa, of the Christian left, and most 
stunning of all was the election of Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega as president in 
Nicaragua, both in 2006. Chávez can be considered influential, for better or worse, in two 
other elections: Ollanta Humala in Perú and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico 
were both leftists nearly successful at winning their electoral bids in 2006.115  
Political figures that look to change the status quo in Latin America have 
appeared before. One example can be found in Cuba as Fidel Castro, with the support of 
Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, looked to instill revolution throughout Latin America. One 
striking difference between Chávez and the Cold War era revolutionaries of Latin 
America is that Chávez has access to financial means that Castro could have only 
dreamed of. Even without the financial means, Castro and Che were able to influence a 
generation of Marxist-Leninist movements throughout Latin America, seriously 
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challenging United States power and influence in the region. With the immense oil 
wealth of Venezuela at his fingertips, Chávez has the resources he needs to buy clout and 
push his agenda on the international stage and challenge United States influence.  
What are the different ways in which Venezuelan Hugo Chávez conducts his 
foreign policy? Is Chávez successful in using Bolivarianism to garner allies in his attempt 
to challenge United States hegemony in the region? If so, under what conditions is 
Chávez successful in getting other countries to act counter to United States interests? 
Venezuela’s use of its oil wealth to assert itself on the international scene is not 
altogether new. How is Chávez’s foreign policy different from previous Venezuelan 
presidents? This chapter will explore these differences. It will also provide a country by 
country evaluation on the impact Chávez’s foreign policy has had. 
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of Chávez’s goal of countering 
United States hegemony and how he hopes to achieve this. Some scholars and 
policymakers argue that U.S.-Latin American relations are steadily declining as Chávez 
pulls other Latin American countries under his ‘anti-imperialist’ umbrella. Bolivian 
President Evo Morales, owing his political success to his ability to capitalize on the social 
and economic grievance of his large utterly poor population, recently established a 
constitutional assembly and is promoting a revolutionary socialist regime. Also seeking 
to find allies other than Washington, Morales even went beyond rhetoric, signing 
documents forming an alliance with a United States nemesis, Iran, backing its nuclear 
program.116 Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, along with Morales, has also adopted 
foreign policy in line with Chávez’s agenda supporting Iran.  
These figures already have an ideological affinity with Chávez. Does Venezuela 
provide the financial resources that allow them autonomy in relation to the United States? 
What about other countries in the region? Does Chávez’s Bolivarian foreign policy 
resonate with Brazil, Argentina, or other non-Andean countries or do they simply take 
Venezuelan oil subsides without changing their foreign policies? The argument of this 
chapter is that Chávez success in pushing his Bolivarian Foreign policy has mostly been 
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overstated and that the resurgence of leftist regimes has had more to do with a general 
sense of frustration over the distribution of wealth throughout Latin America and less 
about Chávez’s diplomacy or ideological persuasion.  
Chávez has been fortunate that Venezuelan oil revenues remained high enough to 
overcome his lack of economic prowess, which appears to be as keen as his diplomatic 
skills. Also, to be considered is his overwhelming success in inspiring the masses 
throughout Latin America as evidenced by the lively receptions he receives as he tours 
the continent. Swarms of anti-Bush protestors gather whenever Latin American leaders 
meet at summits or conferences. Chávez rarely passes up the opportunity to rouse the 
animosity of these crowds of demonstrators. This really only demonstrates that the 
grievance has been there for some time and has festered to the point that any 
spokesperson, even one with warts, that speaks to the plight of this large segment of Latin 
American society will be received with great enthusiasm. 
A.  CHÁVEZ’S QUEST: INTEGRATION OR POWER? 
What alternative is Chávez offering? He hopes that through popular political 
participation he can influence elections throughout Latin America. Understanding the 
environment of grievance that has resulted for President Clinton’s failed Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) agenda, President George W. Bush’s inattention toward Latin 
America, and the overwhelming frustration due to social and economic inequality, he 
stirs up resentment among the masses of poor in hopes they will elect progressive 
governments; those sympathetic to his Bolivarian philosophy of regional unity as a 
counterbalance to the United States.  
Chávez was elected based on promises of social programs aimed primarily at 
improving life for the country’s poor funded by oil revenues. He operates under the 
premise that oil prices will continue at current prices or increase and with the windfall of 
the oil revenue, he will spawn a non-oil economy. His social programs, or missions, 
aimed at education, healthcare, environmental protection, and indigenous rights, are  
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being financed by oil revenues.117 These efforts not only boost his popularity in 
Venezuela, but it inspires other leftist parties and provides the rhetoric that mobilizes to 
the masses of poor voters.  
Venezuela’s willingness to confront the United States is not new and has long 
been an element of Venezuelan foreign policy. Just as Venezuela has sought to become 
independent of international oil companies and control its own production and sale of its 
petroleum, it has also attempted to influence the market in a way to secure prices 
favorable to Venezuela. Chávez intends to assume an autonomous leadership role for 
Venezuela and opposes globalization and neoliberal economic policies.118 More 
specifically, what is different about Venezuela’s foreign policy under Chávez is that he 
has used oil to find allies and build a union of Latin American states that will check 
United States power in the region. He has shown he is particularly interested in 
developing or strengthening ties with long time United States foes, such as Cuba.119 To 
this end, Chávez has used oil as a tool to garner international clout and influence. Other 
countries in Latin America, perhaps too impoverished to overlook the oil deals, have 
jumped on Chávez’s anti-American imperialism bandwagon. Some have even moved 
beyond rhetoric by signing agreements with Iran supporting nuclear development. 
Chávez argues the U.S.-sponsored FTAA is designed to exploit the poor countries 
of the South. Certainly, this resonates with some other Latin American countries. Chávez 
aims for regional integration; a virtually self-reliant union of Latin American states that 
can break from dependence on the United States. This is mainly what ALBA is intended 
to accomplish. Chávez proposes plans for cooperation between Latin American countries 
in energy, communication, finance, military, education, and any other issue related to 
sovereignty. As it relates to trade between the Latin American countries, he promotes 
doing away with tariff barriers on most products, but ALBA’s fundamental purpose goes  
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beyond this. “The explicit aim of ALBA is to promote the ‘social’ side of development, 
eliminating poverty and combating social exclusion in a cooperative effort by Latin 
American nations.”120  
Whether Chávez has been successful at swaying elections by playing to the anti-
U.S. sentiment is uncertain, although Chávez manages to gather masses of sympathetic 
demonstrators wherever he speaks in Latin America.121 What is certain is that Latin 
American has taken a turn toward leftist or progressive governments. Although Chávez 
has demonstrated a willingness to adjust the rules of the democratic political game 
through a new constitution, augmenting the Supreme Court with his loyalists, and a new 
legislative assembly stacked in his favor, among other things, he has been elected and 
reelected with increasing margins. Venezuela is not the only Latin American looking to 
the new-left for answers to their problems of social and economic inequality.   
B.  EVALUATION OF REGIONAL IMPACT 
1.  Cuba 
Venezuela and Cuba have built a strong alliance that allows for the exchange of 
energy resources, financial transactions, development aid, and intelligence and military 
assistance. The resources traded are easy for the sender to provide, but of tremendous 
strategic importance to the recipient.122 For example, with the profits Cuba gains from 
the resale of excess subsidized oil given by Venezuela, the Castro regime has been able to 
strengthen its hold on the Cuban economy by reversing economic liberalization measures 
and reduce its trading dependency on the European Union.123  
Castro’s increasingly astute use of his countries human capital certainly benefits 
Venezuela as well. Chávez needs to make at least the appearance that he will hold to the 
promises of improving the conditions for the poor in Venezuela. The exchange of oil for 
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doctors and teachers allowed Chávez to deliver on the Bolivarian Missions promise that 
made him popular among the poor, at least in a limited degree. Chávez’s successful 
reelections, with increasing margins, can be attributed perhaps to his ability to 
demonstrate his concern for the poor. In a country where poverty abounds, this has 
proven a winning political strategy. With augmentation of Cuban medical personal, 
Chávez can create a presence in areas where political competition is low and thus 
increase voter turnout. Chávez can also reward those loyal to him by sending them to 
Cuba for superior medical treatment.124  
Venezuela also gains militarily from its close relationship with Cuba. Venezuela 
has sought to supplement its small arms cache with 100,000 Russian-made rifles, which 
are a popular choice among guerillas. Chávez also has been intent on adapting military 
doctrine and the structure of the Venezuelan military to meet the “asymmetrical threat” 
posed by the U.S. With decades of experience with Russian military equipment and 
guerilla warfare, Cuba has much to offer Venezuela.125 At the very least, the military 
partnership between the two countries sends a threatening message that the option to 
engage in guerilla style warfare is still available.  
In terms of economics, Chávez has found in Cuba a place to carry out financial 
transactions without domestic and international scrutiny. For this reason, it makes sense 
to place PDVSA’s Caribbean headquarters in Havana, along with PetroCaribe and 
Industrial Bank. Chávez can now sidestep international laws and oversight mechanisms 
while avoiding media coverage as he conducts oil related transactions.  
While Chávez’s relationship has had some success in strengthening his hold on 
power in Venezuela, it has not produced the same swelling of revolutionary fervor 
internationally that the Cuban Revolution did.126 Further complicating matters is the 
position of dependency Cuba is in once again. PetroCaribe, the energy trading initiative, 
has allowed Cuba to receive Venezuelan oil at artificially low prices and resell it to other 
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countries for significant profits. When oil prices drop or when the subsidized oil deals 
end, Cuba will face the similar economic crisis as when the Soviet subsidies ended.127 
Why does Chávez maintain such an overt and high profile relationship with 
Castro? Scholars point to several reasons Chávez publicizes his relationship with Castro. 
First, Chávez turns to radical politics to distract observer, the international left, from an 
otherwise weak performance in his social and human capital development initiatives, and 
his disrespect for democratic institutions and checks on militarism. At least on one area 
he can impress the left, and that is his defiance of imperialism.128  
Cuba’s isolation from the world due to decades of the United States led embargo 
and the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent loss of financial support, was an 
easily made ally for Chávez. Fidel Castro’s charisma, although fading in his old age and 
after years of proof that his socialist plans are an utter failure, still has sway in Latin 
America. Part of Castro’s mystique comes from his success in overthrowing the United 
States backed dictator General Fulgencio Batista. Castro challenged United States 
hegemony not only in Cuba but also throughout Latin America in a way that no other 
figure had done. In this respect, Castro seems the obvious partner for Chávez in his 
contemporary challenge to United States preponderance. 
Perhaps another reason Chávez publicizes his relationship with Castro is to 
increase his bargaining power with moderate governments in Latin America. In his effort 
to derail U.S. attempts to establish alliances in the region, Chávez uses oil as an 
inducement to his neighbors. Although Latin American countries have been willing to 
accept these giveaways, they have been less interested in joining in anti-U.S. alliances 
proposed by Chávez. Chávez uses his relationship with Castro to threaten instability. The 
mere perception that Castro may have ties with and the ability to fund radical groups 
offers Chávez the ability to threaten those subtly that refuse to align with him.129 
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2.  Nicaragua 
At the start of 2009, Nicaragua’s is an interesting case study that highlights the 
complexities of maintaining a relationship with Chávez. With the moral support of 
Chávez, President Daniel Ortega, a long-time foe of the U.S., has taken great strides to 
wipe out democracy in his country. In the months leading up to municipal elections in 
Nicaragua, The Sandinista National Liberation Front, or FSLN, leader and former 
Marxist revolutionary maneuvered to disqualify several candidates from opposition 
parties, as well as order raids on the offices of journalists investigating the election and 
other groups critical of the FSLN. Ortega has also denied accreditation to election 
monitors, claiming they are backed by foreign conspirators bent on destabilizing 
Nicaragua. Perhaps his 20 percent approval rating has persuaded him to pursue such 
tactics, which are now commonplace in Venezuela, where Chávez has made similar 
efforts to disqualify leading opposition candidates in local and provincial elections.130 
Ortega’s underhanded election practices have earned significant criticism from 
the international community. The U.S. recently responded by vowing to withhold $65 
million in aid associated with the Millennium Challenge Account. The EU has also 
threatened to suspend the flow of aid until electoral disputes after last November’s 
contest are resolved. Meanwhile Ortega appears capable of shrugging it all off, which is 
surprising considering foreign aid comprises approximately 10 percent of Nicaragua’s 
national budget in years past, and this year is projected to be up to 25 percent. He 
recently went as far as to demand the U.S. pay reparations amounting to $45 billion for 
its involvement in the Contras war of the 1980s.131  
Ortega’s alliance with Chávez, however, gives him some options otherwise not 
available. If Ortega appears to be unfazed by the potential loss of foreign aid, it is most 
likely due to a pledge by Chávez to during the 2008 ALBA summit to cover the shortfall. 
Chávez has allegedly promised to provide Nicaragua with $500 million in foreign aid if 
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other commitments fall through.132 Similar to the oil deals made with Castro, Chávez has 
supplied oil to Ortega and the FSLN. In early 2007, Chávez participated in a 
groundbreaking ceremony to a new $3.9 billion Venezuelan-backed refinery. Chávez also 
pledged to provide Nicaragua with 10 million barrels of oil at market value along with 
financing for multiple new oil-burning power plants.133  
Unfortunately for Nicaragua, these new deals with Venezuela has only 
compounded an oil dependency problem caused by successive governments to adequately 
plan for power production over the last 40 years. Nicaragua committed to purchasing 
Venezuelan oil when the price per barrel was at $74. The high oil prices of late 2008, 
which peaked at about $130 per barrel, increased what Nicaragua owed for Venezuela for 
its oil dramatically.134 No progress has been made in building the one time celebrated oil 
refinery in Nicaragua. As one Nicaraguan lawmaker went on record to state, “Countries 
like Nicaragua will no longer receive the largess that [Chávez] promised, including oil 
the oil refinery.”135 With oil prices back to normal prices and significantly reduced oil 
production in Venezuela, Chávez is now likely to turn inward to deal with domestic 
pressures.136  
Chávez’s ability to undermine U.S. interests related to Nicaragua can be easily 
overstated. With the reduction of Venezuelan largess and Chávez influence waning under 
the pressure of low oil revenue, Nicaragua’s dependence on foreign aid will once again 
pressure Ortega to abide by democratic standards. Nicaragua may need to appease its 
usual U.S. and EU donors, most of which have shown concern over the Central American 
country’s slide toward authoritarianism. Furthermore, evidence that Ortega is not entirely 
committed to his ideological partner from Venezuela can be seen with Nicaragua’s 
continued interest in maintaining its tie with the U.S. through the Dominican Republic—
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Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR—CAFTA).137 Chávez’s failure to make 
refining capability in Nicaragua a reality is not a surprise to most observers. The highly 
publicized groundbreaking event may have been a mere stunt to signal to the U.S. that 
Venezuela was on the way to breaking oil interdependence between the two countries.  
3.  Ecuador 
The UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas or Union of South American 
Nations) summit of 2008 was emblematic of the serious roadblocks Chávez faces in 
creating unity in the region. Although progress was made toward creating the union, it 
also underscored the roadblocks toward such an endeavor. Ecuadorean President Rafael 
Correa told reporters that since the bombing of a FARC camp on Ecuadorean soil, 
“relations with Colombia are at a low point.”138  
However, Ecuador’s problems are more than just an assault on its sovereignty. 
President Rafael Correa has followed the Chávez model of Bolivarian Revolution: “Win 
an election, call a Constituent Assembly, get a new constitution approved by referendum 
and use it to place your supporters in all the organs of state.”139 Since Chávez’s defeat in 
December’s constitutional referendum, Correa has had to replace the catchwords and 
phrases of Bolivarian Socialism with that of a ‘citizen’ revolution.140 Still, President 
Correa remains popular in Ecuador due in part to his emphasis on social programs. 
Ecuador is an example of a country that has been heavily influenced by Chávez, 
but this is primarily due to frustration over poverty (approximately 40% of the population 
lives in poverty and another 13% live in extreme poverty141) and political instability. 
Suffering from high inflation and low growth, not to mention a series of presidents that 
have failed to serve out their terms in office,142 Ecuador had little to lose by the new-left 
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approach. Furthermore, the inauguration of left-leaning President Correa, whose populist 
political style appears similar to that of Chávez, only demonstrates that such campaigning 
is most effective among the poorest of voters. A closer look at the political context in 
Ecuador shows that it is in fact the economic problems in the country that have prompted 
voters to back populist candidates such as President Correa. Voters simply blamed 
incumbents for these problems and look for a change.143 In this light, it is easier to avoid 
giving too much credit for Ecuador’s slide to the left to Chávez.  
United States relations with Ecuador have suffered since President Correa took 
office. He has declared he will not renew the United States lease on the air base at Manta. 
Although the United States has expressed concern over President Correa’s relationship 
with Chávez, the bigger United States interest at stake is counter drug operations. 
Considering Ecuador’s position between Perú and Colombia, major drug producing 
countries, President Correa’s less than supportive attitude regarding counter drug efforts 
threaten U.S.-relations to a greater extent than his affinity toward Chávez. Nonetheless, 
analysts urge Washington to pursue “pragmatic, low-profile means to maintain open-
market and democratic policies, such as maintaining United States trade preferences with 
Ecuador.”144 
4.  Argentina 
In the case of Argentina, Venezuela, under Chávez, has used its oil wealth to 
garner support for its integration initiative by buying up international debt.  Shortly after 
Argentina’s economic crisis, President Nestor Kirchner, found reason to align with 
Chávez.  Between 2005 and 2006, Venezuela bought about $3.1 billion of Argentine 
bonds.  This helped the first Kirchner administration by allowing him to borrow from a 
source other than the private international lenders he had been accustomed to slamming.  
Chávez motivation may not be as altruistic as he would paint it, either.  The deal resulted  
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in releasing inflationary pressure in Venezuela, along with a $309 million profit due to 
financial maneuvering at the expense of the central bank, and a handsome payoff to local 
Chávez-friendly banks that facilitated the transactions.145           
How effective has Chávez been at developing relations with Argentina?  What 
little impact the purchasing of Argentina’s debt had may have been partially offset by the 
nationalization of Argentine steel company Sidor in Venezuela. The fact that Chávez 
declined to speak with Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner regarding this 
suggests the tie between the two countries is weakening.146 Undoubtedly, this will 
discourage further private investments in Venezuela from Argentina. In addition, 
President Fernandez has struggled in the foreign policy arena due to domestic pressures 
and may have a less fluid relationship with Hugo Chávez than her predecessor. 
Chávez has managed to weaken U.S.-Argentine relations nonetheless. This is 
evident in Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Latin America in mid May, 
which did not include a stop in Buenos Aires. “The omission underscores Washington's 
disappointment with the new Kirchner government, which has continued to strengthen 
ties with Mr. Chávez while accusing the United States of political motives in an 
investigation into a suspected $800,000 secret campaign contribution from Venezuela to 
Mrs. Kirchner.”147 
5.  Perú 
Venezuela’s relations with Perú may provide insight into how Chávez has fared in 
building Latin American unity. It is the poverty stricken rural population of Perú that is 
most sympathetic to Chávez and his Bolivarian Revolution ideas. The lack of doctors and 
teachers outside of Lima has long been a problem for Perú and Chávez’s talk of 
improving in these areas resonates among the peasants and indigenous people of Perú. 
Also condemning United States imperialism are college students, a regular source of 
leftist sentiment in the country. President Alan García could have easily joined Chávez in 
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his mission to counter United States influence during his first, more leftist term as 
president from 1985 to 1990. However, President García is now more interested in free 
trade, which lines him up well with Washington. President García detests Chávez today, 
and this may be due in part to Chávez’s endorsement of rival candidate Ollanta Humala.  
President Garcia’s ability to tie the Chávez weight around Humala’s neck during 
the campaign could be indicative of what may happen to other Chávez allies currently 
holding office throughout Latin America. As the tide of public opinion sways and 
Chavistas become disillusioned with the socialist movement, it is probable that Chávez 
allies will have trouble securing re-election or retaining power. Fear of policies and 
efforts that have consolidated power for Chávez will be an obstacle during any potential 
reelection bids for these pro-Chávez politicians.148 The anti-Chávez sentiments endure 
among Peruvian politicians, as indicated by the Peruvian Congress’ investigation of the 
Casas del Alba, a Bolivarian NGO in Peru. 
Chávez’s influence in the rural areas is also important to note. The same 
conditions of marginalization and political exclusion that make Chávez’s rhetoric 
appealing in the highlands of Perú would have rendered these groups nearly 
inconsequential in the political scene a decade or so ago. However, today indigenous 
groups, leftist guerrillas, and anti-government groups make their grievances felt on Lima. 
Protests have closed roads and interfered with tourism, a mainstay for Perú, and led to 
clashes. García’s government accuses Venezuela of supporting the protests. President 
García’s lack of public approval and Chávez-style anti-U.S. rhetoric magnifies the 
problem.149 
6.  Brazil 
Venezuela’s efforts to counter United States hegemony also challenges Brazil’s 
bid for regional superpower status. As a result, Brazil’s far more moderate President Luiz 
Inacio Lula da Silva has had to make somewhat of a shift in Brazilian foreign policy. 
Initially bold about his intention to strengthen Brazil’s leadership role in Latin America, 
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challenges by Chávez, among others, to his foreign policies have required President Lula 
to make some adjustments toward a more patient and quiet leadership role 
internationally.150 For example, Venezuela was brought into Mercosur only to have 
Chávez push for it to be dissolved.151 President Lula's plans for CASA (Community of 
South American Nations) fell apart as result of Chávez's alternate integration efforts. 
And, with the trend started or reinforced by Venezuela, Bolivia nationalized Brazil's gas 
investments in the country.152 
Chávez has served as a thorn in President Lula’s side as it related to Brazil’s 
foreign policy agenda by “calling for Mercosur to be 'buried', pressing for creation of the 
'Banco del Sur' development bank and resisting the sort of market-friendly policies that 
have underpinned Brazil's continued economic penetration of the continent.” In addition 
to challenging Brazil’s leadership role in Latin America, Chávez has “covertly sought to 
undermine critical aspects of the Brazilian national interest.” Although Chávez calls for 
Latin American integration, he is “seen in Brasilia as a figure needing to be 
contained.”153 
With regard to President Lula’s own South American integration plans, he has 
minimized the disputes between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, calling the 
Colombian attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador “dramatic in appearance, [but] just a 
passing phenomenon” and continued by calling it a “sign of life.”154 In fact, President 
Lula’s comments on the subject of integration appear to be more grandiose than Chávez, 
referring to his dream as “the creation of the great South American nation.”155 These 
words resemble something coming from Chávez’s playbook, or even Simón Bolívar 
himself.  
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Brazilian officials say then President Fernando Henrique Cardoso originally 
presented the plan for a South American union in 2000. Now President Lula finds himself 
fighting to regain the initiative. The same official told the press following the May 2008 
UNASUR meeting, “If Brazil does not do it at this time, Chávez will do it, his own 
way.”156  The rivalry between Brazil and Venezuela initially slowed Chávez’s plans for 
creating the Bank of the South, or Banco del Sur.  Brazilian officials were determined to 
tie the bank to UNASUR, stating the two countries were not in agreement with regards to 
size and mission of the bank.  However, observers point to the divergence as a clear sign 
of competition for influence in the region.  Lula, a socialist who prefers market-friendly 
economic policies, is at odds with Chávez, who favors a strong role for the Venezuelan 
government in directing the economy at home and regionally.157         
C.  CONCLUSION 
Chávez has been successful in undermining United States efforts to promote 
increased free trade in the region by highlighting the failures of neoliberal economic 
policies. However, Chávez’s overall push for regional integration that excludes the 
United States has failed.  Even though some Andean countries suffering from poverty and 
social inequality have thrown up leaders sympathetic to some of the foreign policy 
initiatives and goals Chávez has pushed, for the most part, other Latin American nations 
have not seen the wisdom of challenging the United States. Venezuela is unique in that it 
has tremendous oil wealth that can compensate for the lack of a political prowess by 
buying the appearance of social progress in the areas that please President Chávez’s 
domestic constituents. This, along with his manipulation of the constitution and electoral 
system, it appears President Chávez will be around for some time. However, no other 
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in the region such as Venezuela. Furthermore, the lack of a “coherent ideological model 
that can be replicated in other countries” makes it difficult for Chávez to gain the 
momentum he needs.158  
There are significant obstacles Chávez must overcome for his agenda to be 
successful.  Chávez’s plan has only worked with the poorer and weaker countries. There 
is a group of progressive governments in Latin America (Chile, Brazil, and Perú) that 
reject Chávez’s style and much of his agenda and take a more principled stand in favor of 
democracy.  There are also the governments that are U.S. allies, such as Colombia (and to 
a large extent Mexico).  The conservative, pro-U.S. government of President Álvaro 
Uribe has experienced a decline in relations with Venezuela. One source of contention 
between the two nations is the border conflict, with several cross-border incursions, some 
resulting in casualties. President Uribe made attempts to minimize this issue, but anti-
Venezuelan sentiment by Colombians continues. The problems associated with 
Colombia’s inability to govern its entire territory are magnified by Venezuela’s tolerance 
and at times support of insurgents using Venezuela as a safe haven.159  
Furthermore, while leaders of Latin America met in May 2008 to formally set up 
UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas or Union of South American Nations), 
members also discussed establishing a South American Defense Council. Colombia 
wanted no part in it due to Venezuela’s relationship with the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The 
spillover of Colombian violence into Venezuela has been a source of tension between the 
two countries, but the tension has been increased due to Chávez’s criticism of Plan 
Colombia, which is designed in part to combat the insurgency.  
Chávez has been willing to undermine the governments of countries that are allies 
with the United States. Besides his apparent sympathy with the FARC, Chávez is critical 
of Colombia in large part because of its alliance with the United States.160 Colombia has 
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succeeded in dealing with violent insurgents in the country. In fact, since Chávez came to 
power the FARC has actually lost ground and been considerably weakened.161 Although 
this is due in part to weaknesses in the FARC and the death of its leader Manuel 
Marulanda Vélez, also known as Tirofijo (sure shot), the group’s last link to the original 
ideology that gave formal birth to the group in 1964, Colombian ties to the United States 
and aid tied to Plan Colombia must be credited at least in part. Still, regardless of how 
insignificant, the support Chávez gives the violent insurgents of Colombia is a slap in the 
face of the Colombian government and will be an enormous obstacle to any attempts to 
create the integration for which Chávez was hoping. At a Latin America summit held in 
May 2008, President Uribe responded to Chávez’s criticism, “The only thing we ask is 
for no one to shelter terrorists.”162  
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IV.  POLICY TOWARD VENEZUELA (TODAY AND AFTER 
CHÁVEZ) 
A.  RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND VENEZUELA 
At the beginning of the post-Cold War period, U.S.-Venezuelan relations were 
cordial and U.S. policymakers did not foresee any substantial change, as they perceived 
Venezuela to be politically stable. Considering the fact the Venezuela was a major 
supplier of oil to the U.S., there certainly was sufficient incentive to keep relations 
positive.163 Even when Chávez assumed power, Washington avoided open confrontation 
with him initially, “choosing instead to emphasize the disparity between the Venezuelan 
leader’s radical rhetoric and his actual policies.”164 This was based on the economic 
interdependency between the two countries.  
When it became evident Chávez was disregarding democratic institutions in an 
effort to consolidate power, relations deteriorated drastically as Chávez began his verbal 
attacks on the U.S. and President Bush. To make matters worse, and perhaps the greatest 
diplomatic mistake the U.S. made with regard to dealing with Chávez, was that the White 
House responded to the April 2002 coup in Venezuela by stating the administration 
“looked forward to working with the transitional government.”  Not only did this give the 
obvious appearance that the U.S. condoned the break with democratic rule in Venezuela, 
but it also raised questions about whether the U.S. may have somehow supported the 
coup.  Although subsequent investigations found that the U.S. had no part in the coup 
attempt, Chávez astutely used the incident to stir up anti-U.S. sentiment and question 
U.S. democracy promotion.165 
This certainly fits into Chávez’s populist style.  He is a realist and a populist who 
seeks to accumulate power at home and abroad.  He is willing to say whatever will garner 
the greatest number of votes and he will manipulate democratic institutions to not only 
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suppress his opposition, but to remove checks on executive power.  Furthermore, his 
foreign policy is designed to impress his anti-U.S. constituency in Venezuela and create 
alliances that threaten stability in the region.       
U.S. and Venezuelan interests have been at odds despite the changes in U.S. 
administrations.  They will continue to be so in a unipolar world.  This can be seen by the 
interview with then President-elect Barack Obama aired on the Spanish-language 
network Univision in mid January 2009.  Referring to documents seized from the 
guerrilla group linking Chávez to the FARC and efforts to undermine Columbian 
President Alvaro Uribe, Obama said, “we need to be firm when we see this news, that 
Venezuela is exporting terrorist activities or supporting malicious entities like the 
FARC.” Obama went on to say Chávez had “been a force that has interrupted progress in 
the region.” Chávez responded several days later suggesting there was still time for 
Obama to correct his views and added, “no one should say that I threw the first stone… 
He threw it at me.” Chávez also suggested that since the U.S. considered him “an 
obstacle for progress in Latin America,” then the U.S. would ensure he was removed. The 
diatribe continued with Chávez accusing Washington of wanting to topple him so as to 
“steal the country’s immense oil reserve.”166 Although Obama’s presidency has just 
begun, relations with Venezuela do not appear to be improving immediately.  
B.  THE FUTURE OF VENEZUELA (WHAT DOES POST-FUJIMORI PERÚ 
TEACH US?) 
Venezuela and Perú have some political commonalities. According to Martín 
Tanaka, in his article From Crisis to Collapse of the Party System and Dilemmas of 
Democratic Representation, both have had presidents who have used a formal democratic 
political system to create, in practice, authoritarian regimes.167 President Alberto 
Fujimori was a “personalistic leader with neo-populist and anti-system discourses who 
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expressed the popular dissatisfaction with traditional actors.”168 Perú experienced a crisis 
because of failed state-centric economic policies and subsequent market reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s. This was an added challenge to “an always shaky democratic 
experiment”169 that in 1980 emerged from twelve years of military rule. All this 
coincided with the growth of the extremely violent and effective Sendero Luminoso.  
Tanaka writes that Fujimori’s candidacy “reflects a crisis of representation, and… 
exploited popular dissatisfaction with traditional politics,” and that he “represented some 
previously excluded popular sector, under plebiscitary, not democratic, schemes.”170 
Once in office, he “undermined political competition” and “eliminated the logic of 
checks and balances inherent to democratic rule and [paved] the road to 
authoritarianism.”171 President Fujimori was able to consolidate power through 
outwardly democratic means, or by what Tanaka calls “plebiscitarian legitimacy.”172 
Although he was speaking of Venezuela, Brazilian President Lula’s comment that there 
can be trouble with a country that has too much democracy can easily be applied to Perú 
during President Fujimori’s administration.  
An interesting point can be made here. Cynthia McClintock in her article, An 
Unlikely Comeback in Perú, argued that considering the concentration of power former 
President Fujimori was able to achieve, “the holding of free and fair elections” 
represented “a step forward for Perú in its uneasy return to democracy since November 
2000.”173 When Fujimori’s corrupt government fell apart, democratic processes prevailed 
in bringing about a peaceful political change. The 2006 election provides further 
evidence of a strengthening of democracy in Perú. Even though the election was close,  
 
 
                                                 
168 Tanaka, “From Crisis to Collapse of the Party System and Dilemmas of Democratic 
Representation,” 47. 
169 Ibid., 48. 
170 Ibid., 63. 
171 Ibid.  
172 Ibid., 64. 
173 Ibid., 95. 
 56
the losing candidate accepted the results. Furthermore, there was a large voter turnout and 
“and citizens chose a candidate who respects democracy, rather than one whose 
proclivities appear authoritarian.”174  
Looking back to the administration of President Toledo provides further evidence 
that democracy strengthened after President Fujimori’s authoritarian regime. President 
Toledo convened the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, which provided a report 
on human rights violations from the previous government. The media that was once 
controlled and exploited by the Fujimori regime was now free to report without 
government restrictions. Free and fair competitive elections at the regional level were 
held in 2002.175 All of this looked promising to those interested in consolidating 
democracy. President Toledo, however, still faced significant challenges. During his 
administration, the country experienced significant economic growth, especially 
compared to other countries in the region, including Chile and Costa Rica. There was 
approximately 5 percent annual GDP growth from 2002 to 2006, inflation was low, and 
fiscal management was strong. However, economic inequality and poor distribution of 
wealth challenged the people’s commitment to democracy. As McClintock writes, “the 
benefits of growth were limited primarily to the top third of the income distribution and 
barely reached the poor, who make up 48 percent of the population.”176 She continues, 
“Unemployment remained stubbornly high [and] real wages were stagnant.”177 The poor 
in Perú sought justice and held President Toledo accountable for their economic plight.  
Latin America is more economically unequal than other regions. In Perú, as in the 
rest of Latin America, inequality impedes democracy. According to The Economist, 
“income inequality goes hand in hand with unequal access to good things such as 
education, health and political power—inequalities that violate basic principles of 
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democracy.”178 The article continues by arguing that democracy has not served to reduce 
inequality significantly. This is attributed to the fact that taxes and government spending 
is “significantly below what is needed to support rapid social and economic 
development” and although social spending has increased, “much of this still favors the 
better off: examples include pensions, universities and health schemes linked to social-
security systems.”179 Despite the damage President Fujimori’s regime inflicted on 
democracy in Perú, it appears to have recovered, as evidenced by the Toledo 
administration and the 2006 election. The transition to democracy from an authoritarian 
regime in Perú may be useful when considering the potential for the return of democracy 
following Chávez. At least, there is some hope for a positive transition. 
C.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The days in which the U.S. was considered to have “acted in an imperious, 
unilateral, and paternalistic manner in Latin America” in an effort to combat communism 
are over.180  The end of the Cold War, and as well as immigration and globalization, have 
changed the way in which the U.S. acts towards Latin America. The fact that there is 
concern over China’s influence in the region is one indicator that the U.S. must find a 
new grand strategy for the region. More specific to Venezuela, Chávez’s attempts at 
courting Iran and Moscow also signify a dramatic change in geo-politics in the 21st 
century. Chávez turns to rival the U.S. because Latin America leaders have that option 
now more than ever before. 
Chávez’s response to the recent global economic crisis has provided further 
evidence his ultimate goal has been to maintain power. One indicator may be his recent 
decision to solicit bids from Western oil companies after intense efforts to nationalize oil 
fields in Venezuela and impose hefty taxes and royalties on foreign oil. The drop in oil 
prices has stunted progress toward the 21st century socialist state envisioned by Chávez. 
The lack of reinvestment into the Venezuelan oil industry has resulted in reduced oil 
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production, further compounding the problem. In addition, a strain on the Venezuelan oil 
industry is the expansion of Petróleos de Venezuela’s role in his political effort, using the 
company’s resources for infrastructure development, distribution of food, and agriculture 
projects. Mending ties with Western companies has become a matter of necessity for 
Chávez as he tries to buoy his extensive social programs. As one oil-industry expert in 
Brazil recently stated, “If re-engaging with foreign oil companies is necessary to his 
political survival, then Chávez will do it.”181  
Like most petro states, Venezuela has become over reliant on oil. In 2008, the 
country relied on oil for 93 percent of its revenue. When Chávez took office ten years 
earlier, it was only at 69 percent.182 With the nationalizing of other industries, such as 
agriculture, and steel manufacturing, and utility companies, foreign investors are keeping 
their distance from Chávez. As the world economic crisis continues Chávez may be 
rejoicing in what he claims is the breakdown of capitalism. Ironically, like most oil-
driven economies, previous economic booms fueled the growth of his program.183 He 
squandered vast amounts of capital neutralizing his domestic political opposition while 
building international alliances through oil deals.184  
His anti-U.S. rhetoric may appear to be ideologically based. However, some 
scholars suggest that is merely the use of political capital to compensate for Venezuela’s 
financial woes.185 As oil prices plummet, Chávez’s is losing the leverage he was once 
fortunate to have during the oil boom of the early part of his tenure. With demand for 
energy outpacing the increase in production, particularly considering the growth of Asian 
markets, Chávez is expecting to wait out what he thinks is a temporary dip in prices.186 
This would explain his recent efforts to court foreign investors for development of  
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extraction projects. This would take more time as executive than he currently has 
available. Chávez has a long-term vision for his presidency that take him beyond the 
current economic bust.  
Chávez may be overly optimistic about his ability to ride out the economic slump. 
The realm of energy production is changing dramatically, and in ways Chávez cannot 
compete. Many governments are taking strides toward alternative forms of energy. 
Reuters reports “investments in alternative energy technologies have quadrupled in the 
United States in the last two years.”187 With significant progress in these technologies, 
particularly with wing and solar power, not to mention the drop in prices of energy from 
these sources, it is has obviously been a source of contention for Chávez. As part of his 
anti-U.S. campaign, he has gone as far as accusing the U.S. of concocting the global 
warming scare.188 Regardless, the U.S. must continue on the path of energy 
independence.   
The U.S. must solidify its strategy to best deal with the Chávez challenge.  In the 
short term, U.S. policy makers must continue to focus on Chávez’s action rather than his 
words.  It is important U.S. policymakers understand his populist style, and that he uses 
his anti-U.S. rhetoric to build support from his anti-establishment constituencies.  The 
actual threat Chávez poses to the U.S. is minimal considering Venezuela’s high 
dependence on U.S. markets.  The U.S. should take a pragmatic approach to dealing with 
Venezuela by emphasizing the potential for progress in regional concerns such as energy 
security, poverty, and economic growth.  While it is doubtful Chávez will be receptive to 
discussion, it will signal to the rest of the region that the U.S. is willing to work toward 
solutions.  As a long term strategy, the U.S. must strengthen its commitment to assisting 
Latin American countries in alleviating poverty and strengthening democracy.189  Much  
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of Chávez base consist of the poor and marginalized.  While poverty in the region will 
continue to be a problem for some time, efforts by the U.S. to assist in economic growth 
will reduce resentment among the poor and hostility toward the U.S.                
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